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Symmetric informationally complete measurements (SICs) are elegant, celebrated and broadly useful discrete
structures in Hilbert space. We introduce a more sophisticated discrete structure compounded by several SICs. A
SIC-compound is defined to be a collection of d3 vectors in d-dimensional Hilbert space that can be partitioned
in two different ways: into d SICs and into d2 orthonormal bases. While a priori their existence may appear
unlikely when d > 2, we surprisingly answer it in the positive through an explicit construction for d = 4.
Remarkably this SIC-compound admits a close relation to mutually unbiased bases, as is revealed through
quantum state discrimination. Going beyond fundamental considerations, we leverage these exotic properties to
construct a protocol for quantum key distribution and analyze its security under general eavesdropping attacks.
We show that SIC-compounds enable secure key generation in the presence of errors that are large enough to
prevent the success of the generalisation of the six-state protocol.
Introduction.— Quantum information theory has estab-
lished a permanent link between the foundations of quantum
theory and quantum information technologies. This has rein-
vigorated interest in understanding the ultimate limitations
of quantum states and measurements as discrete structures
in Hilbert space. Quantum states and measurements have
a rich geometry that has no counterpart in classical models.
Therefore, it is unsurprising that the most elegant and sophis-
ticated discrete structures that can be found in Hilbert space
frequently also are the most celebrated and useful resources
for the processing of quantum information.
An outstanding example is known as a symmetric informa-
tionally complete set of pure quantum states (SIC). A SIC is
a maximal set (size d2) of d-dimensional states, {|φk〉}d2k=1,
with the property that the overlap between any pair of states
has the same magnitude:
|〈φk|φl〉|2 = dδk,l + 1
d+ 1
, (1)
where the constant on right-hand-side is fixed by normalisa-
tion. Interestingly, a SIC can both be interpreted as a set of
states (as above) and as a generalised quantum measurement
(positive operator-valued measure, POVM) with d2 possible
outcomes. The measurement operators in such a SIC-POVM
are merely the subnormalised projectors of a SIC, namely
{ 1d |φk〉〈φk|}d
2
k=1.
SICs have been investigated for a long time in many dif-
ferent contexts [1–5]. Their relevance in pure mathematics
is remarkably diverse [6–8] and they even have technologi-
cal applications in high-resolution radar [9] and speech recog-
nition [10]. However, their interest in physics stems from
their prominent role in quantum information theory [5]. SIC-
POVMs are key tools for quantum state tomography [11–13],
which has motivated their experimental realisation in high-
dimensional Hilbert spaces [14–16]. Generally, SICs and
SIC-POVMs are used in a range of protocols: quantum key
distribution (QKD) [17–19], entanglement detection [20–22],
device-independent random number generation [23, 24], di-
mension witnessing [25] and characterisation of quantum de-
vices [26–30]. Moreover, SICs have been studied in the con-
text of quantum nonlocality [24, 31–33] and they have an in-
teresting foundational role in QBism [34]. All this has trig-
gered much interest in addressing the existence of SICs in
general Hilbert space dimensions. Presently, existence has
been proven numerically at least up to d = 151 [5, 35–37]
and is conjectured for any d (see [37] for a review).
In this work, we introduce a natural discrete Hilbert space
structure that is compounded of many separate SICs. The re-
sulting SIC-compound is a set of d3 pure d-dimensional quan-
tum states, denoted {|ψjk〉}jk for j ∈ [d2] and k ∈ [d] (where
[s] = {1, . . . , s}) with the following two properties:
I For every k, the states {|ψjk〉}j form a SIC.
II For every j, the states {|ψjk〉}k form an orthonormal
(ON) basis of Hilbert space.
In a handy terminology, we say that a SIC-compound is com-
posed of d “orthogonal SICs“, in the sense that elements num-
bered j in the d SICs are orthogonal to each other. Indeed,
given that the existence of SICs is a longstanding open prob-
lem [38], deciding the existence of a SIC-compound for a
given d is expected to be even more challenging. A priori,
it may seem unlikely that SIC-compounds exist at all when
d > 2 (it turns out that d = 2 is exceptional). We address the
existence of SIC-compounds for d = 3, . . . , 8. For d = 3 we
prove that no SIC-compound exists and for d = 5, 6, 7, 8 we
give evidence in support of the same conclusion. Remarkably,
however, for d = 4we are able to analytically construct a SIC-
compound, thus proving that they, in fact, can exist in higher-
dimensional Hilbert spaces. The many symmetries of the SIC-
compound, which go beyond its defining properties, allow it
to be represented as a Latin square. Moreover, we find that the
SIC-compound admits a strong connection to mutually unbi-
ased bases (MUBs) which is revealed through quantum state
discrimination. Equippedwith the fundamental understanding
of the SIC-compound, we consider its practical application
for quantum information processing. Specifically, we place
the SIC-compound at the heart of protocols for QKD, analyze
their security under coherent attacks and show their improved
2robustness as compared to the four-dimensional counterpart
of the six-state protocol [39] (which extends the celebrated
BB84 protocol [40]).
Qubit SIC-compound.— It is instructive to first consider the
simple example of a qubit SIC-compound. In terms of the
Bloch sphere representation, a SIC corresponds to four unit
Bloch vectors such that any pair has equal magnitude over-
lap. Hence, the four vectors point to the vertices of a regular
tetrahedron. For each vector, the unique orthogonal state is
represented by the antipodal Bloch vector, and therefore the
four antipodal Bloch vectors also form a regular tetrahedron.
By construction, the two SICs together form a SIC-compound.
Their convex hull is a cube inscribed in the Bloch sphere.
Generating SICs.— When d > 2, the existence of a SIC-
compound is far less clear. In order to address the matter,
one benefits much from the established knowledge of SICs
which heavily exploits the Weyl-Heisenberg (WH) group.
This group has two generators, X and Z , which are required
to satisfy the relations Xd = Zd = 1 and ZX = ωXZ ,
where ω = e
2pii
d . Every known SIC (with a single exception
in dimension 8 [3]) has been obtained by applying the WH
group in the following ansatz,
|φj〉 = Xj1Zj2 |ϕ〉, (2)
for j ≡ (j1, j2) ∈ [d]2 and for a suitably chosen so-called
fiducial state |ϕ〉. The group generators can conveniently be
chosen as the so-called shift and clock operators
X =
d−1∑
k=0
|k + 1〉〈k| Z =
d−1∑
k=0
ωk|k〉〈k|. (3)
For d = 2, 3 all SICs are obtained via this ansatz [41, 42]
and the same is true for any prime d provided that the SIC
admits some group structure [43]. Moreover, there is numeri-
cal evidence supporting that all SICs for d = 4, 5, 6, 7 can be
obtained via the WH group [44].
No qutrit SIC-compound.— Consider the case of qutrits
(d = 3). In view of the above, by showing that no SIC-
compound can be obtained via the WH group, we disprove
their existence in full generality. Note that the problem is sub-
stantially simplified due to the fact that Eq (2) generates SICs
by unitarily acting on a fiducial state. Therefore, in order to
construct orthogonal SICs, we must only find orthogonal fidu-
cial states. However, for qutrit systems there are uncountably
many relevant fiducial states [4, 5] (for a fixed representation
of the WH group). Fortunately, using the representation in
Eq (3), they all admit a simple parameterisation which al-
lows us efficiently investigate their orthogonalities. In Ap-
pendix A, we detail the analysis for d = 3 and show that no
more than two orthogonal SICs can be constructed. An ex-
ample of two orthogonal SICs is straightforwardly obtained
from choosing the two fiducial vectors |ϕ1〉 = 1√2 (1, 1, 0)T
and |ϕ2〉 = 1√2 (1,−1, 0)T.
Ququart SIC-compound.— For the case of ququarts (d =
4), in contrast to qutrits, there are only 256 fiducial states
[45] that yield SICs under the ansatz (2) (for a fixed repre-
sentation). Within these, one can find a SIC-compound with
a simple analytical form. To present it, we change the repre-
sentation of the WH-group so that the generators are written
as [46]
X = e
ipi
4


0 i 0 0
−1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 i 0

 , Z = e ipi4


0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 1
i 0 0 0
0 i 0 0

 . (4)
Note that the global phase factors only serve to ensure the
correct sign ofXd andZd. Consider also the unitary operators
U =


0 0 1 0
0 0 0 i
1 0 0 0
0 −i 0 0

 , V =


0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 −i
0 0 i 0

 , (5)
which generate a projective representation of the Klein four-
group Z2 × Z2. Application of 1 , U , V , and UV on the
vector |ϕ1〉 = (t, i, i, i)T/n produces an orthonormal basis,
where t =
√
2 +
√
5 and n =
√
5 +
√
5. Call these states
{|ϕk〉}k∈[4]. Then it can be easily verified that the states
|ψjk〉 = Xj1Zj2 |ϕk〉 form a SIC for each value of k, where
j = (j1, j2). By construction, the states {|ψjk〉}k∈[4] form an
ON-basis for each of the 16 values of j. We remark that if the
computational basis is chosen as separable, all 64 states are
iso-entangled [47]; the entanglement negativity is 1n2
√
1 + t2.
This constitutes an interesting parallel to the concept of iso-
entangled MUBs [48] (which upholds the same degree of en-
tanglement per state as the SIC-compound [49]).
By definition, the ququart SIC-compound contains four
SICs and 16 ON-bases of C4. Interestingly, it turns out that it
upholds two additional symmetries (that have no counterpart
in the qubit SIC-compound). Firstly, a careful examination
of {|ψjk〉}j,k shows that every state is not a member of pre-
cisely one ON-basis, but in fact of two different ON-bases.
Therefore, the SIC-compound houses an additional 16 ON-
bases. Secondly, one finds that every state |ψjk〉 upholds the
defining (SIC-like) overlap property (1) with 27 other states
in the SIC-compound, instead of the expected 15. The addi-
tional 12 SIC-like overlaps originate from an additional SIC
which shares four states with the defining SIC in the com-
pound. Thus, every state is a member of two distinct SICs (see
Ref [47] and Appendix C) that have four elements in common.
Since we are now faced with a total of 8 SICs and 32
ON-bases present in the compound, one benefits from nicely
organising the elements. A useful observation is that for
each of the four defining SICs, one can find four sets of
four states such that each is an orbit under the WH subgroup
{1 , X2, Z2, X2Z2} (again a projective Klein four-group). By
suitably permuting the label j ∈ [16] in {|ψjk〉}jk, so that j1
indexes the subgroup and j2 indexes the application of 1 , X ,
Z , and XZ , we can group these orbits together and represent
the SIC-compound as a Latin square (see Figure 1).
On existence in d = 5, 6, 7, 8.— For dimensions d =
5, 6, 7, 8, using the representation (3), there are only finitely
many relevant fiducial states to be considered [45, 50]. The
number of states that yield SICs when the WH group, in
the representation (3), is applied to them can be regarded as
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FIG. 1: Schematic of the 64 states in the ququart SIC-compound.
First, let us index the columns by k ∈ [4] and the rows by j2 ∈ [4]
and let each block contain the four states {|ψjk〉}4j1=1 (recall j =
(j1, j2)). Then, each column corresponds to one of the defining SICs
of the compound. The collection of elements in the identically la-
belled (‘1’,‘2’,‘3’ and ‘4’) blocks constitute the four additional SICs
present in the compound. Secondly, let us view the Latin square as
an illustration of the 16 individual states in each row of the previous
interpretation. The block with coordinates (j2, k) corresponds to the
state |ψjk〉 (for any chosen row index j1). Each row (of four states)
then corresponds to a defining ON-basis. For j1 = 1, 2, 3, 4, the
collection of elements with identical labels (‘1’,‘2’,‘3’ and ‘4’) con-
stitute the total of 16 additional ON-bases present in the compound.
known if we combine the high quality numerical results of
Ref [35] with the group theoretical analysis of Ref [45]. We
have enumerated all of them and exhaustively checked the
number of orthogonal SICs that can be constructed using these
states. We find that the number of orthogonal SICs varies (2,
4, 2 and 5 respectively) and that no SIC-compound can be
constructed. Reminding ourselves of the strong numerical ev-
idence in support of there not existing any other SICs than
those that we have explicitly constructed for d = 5, 6, 7, our
results render the existence of a SIC-compound for d = 5, 6, 7
very unlikely. However, as previously mentioned, dimen-
sion 8 also houses SICs that are not based on the WH group
[3, 51, 52]. Whether a SIC-compound can be formed from
these exceptional SICs is left as an open question.
Furthermore, in Appendix B we present a method for cer-
tifying [53] a SIC-compound (if it exists) or falsifying their
existence (if it does not exist) under the sole assumption of
dimension d.
Discriminating the SIC-compound with MUBs.—The
ququart SIC-compound admits a simple operational relation
to a set of four MUBs. Consider that for fixed j2 and k,
we try to discriminate between the four (equiprobable) states
{|ψj,k〉}j1 . Since these states are linearly independent, we can
use the “pretty goodmeasurement” [54] which is the ON-basis
obtained from |ξj,k〉 = T−1/2j2,k |ψj,k〉 by varying j1, where
Tj2,k =
∑
j1
|ψj,k〉〈ψj,k|. Measuring in this basis is in fact
optimal for minimising the error probability of the discrimina-
tion, which follows from [55]. Moreover, the resulting bases
for given j2 but different k are identical, while the bases for
different j2 are mutually unbiased. Thus, the four rows of the
Latin square correspond to four MUBs which, interestingly,
are iso-entangled with the largest possible entanglement neg-
ativity (each basis element has an entanglement negativity of
1√
8
). In Appendix C, we show that the relation between the
SIC-compound and the four MUBs is not a coincidence but
traces back to the fact that the Clifford group contains a copy
of the bipartite WH group. Finally, we note that also the fifth
MUB (the computational basis) emerges from state discrim-
ination in the SIC-compound: a state is randomly sampled
from a given column of the Latin square and we are asked to
determine which row it belongs to. The optimal measurement
is the computational basis.
Application in QKD.— Let us now consider the usefulness
of the d = 4 SIC-compound in QKD. Consider a prepare and
measureQKD scheme in which Alice transmits a random state
|ψjk〉 and Bob randomly measures in one of the 16 defining
ON bases of the SIC-compound. A variety of specific QKD
protocols can be constructed from this starting point, depend-
ing on how Alice and Bob transform or “sift” their resulting
data into the “raw key”. Here we focus on just two sifting
protocols. As in the original BB84 protocol, Alice and Bob
can use the bases in the compound, taking their k values as
the sifted key when their j1 and j2 values both match. Call
this Sifting B. Another possibility, which we denote Sifting
A, is that j1 is taken as the sifted key value when their j2 val-
ues agree, but their k values disagree. (This turns out to be
slightly more favorable than when the k values match.) Both
protocols finish with the standard steps of parameter estima-
tion, information reconciliation, and privacy amplification to
output a secure key. Since both protocols use the same prepare
and measure setup but differ only in the classical postprocess-
ing, we will see that Alice and Bob can first performparameter
estimation on their data and then decide which sifting strategy
to employ.
We establish the security of both protocols against arbitrary
attacks by adapting the methods of [56–58] to ensure security
against collective attacks and then invoking [59] to ensure se-
curity against arbitrary attacks. The analysis proceeds in the
entanglement-based scenario of the protocol. Here Eve sup-
plies Alice and Bob with many copies of an arbitrary bipar-
tite state ρAB , to which she retains the purification in system
E, and Alice and Bob each randomly measure the bases as-
sociated with the compound on their respective subsystems.
The resulting statistics of their classical measurement choices
j and results k, as well as the possible collective attacks, are
precisely the same as the prepare-and-measure scenario.
Crucially, the symmetries of the SIC-compound translate
into symmetries of both sifting protocols, and this simplifies
the form of ρAB . As we show in Appendix D, for both Sift-
ing A and B we can assume without loss of generality that
ρAB = (1−p−q)ΦAB + qpiAB + pκAB for some positive
parameters q, p with q+ p ≤ 1, where ΦAB is the maximally-
entangled state, piAB is the maximally-mixed state, and κAB
is the diagonal state of perfect uniform correlation. In other
words, the joint state is a partially depolarized and dephased
maximally-entangled state.
Alice and Bob can determine both p and q in the parameter
estimation phase as follows. It turns out that the probability of
sifting success for Sifting A increases with increasing q, while
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FIG. 2: Regions of positive key rate for various protocols. For each
q, the curves show the value of p such that the key rate is zero. Sifting
B outperforms the analog of the qubit six-state protocol using a full
set of five MUBs. Sifting A can tolerate p→ 1 as q → 0. Together,
Sifting A and B nearly replicate the region of positive coherent in-
formation −H(A|B)ρ from the state ρAB .
the probability of error in the raw key depends on both p and
q. Therefore, before they commit to either sifting procedure,
Alice and Bob can use their data to determine both parameters
and only then decide which sifting procedure is more appro-
priate. Knowing the state ρAB , it is then a simple matter to
apply known bounds on the rate of key extraction using infor-
mation reconciliation and privacy amplification.
Fig. 2 depicts the values of q and p which lead to positive
key rates. It also displays the region of positive key for the
generalisation of the six-state protocol to d = 4 (using a full
set of five MUBs). To enable a fair comparison, the latter
protocol also discards sifting information [61]. Its symmetries
ensure that it treats all states delivered by Eve as depolarized
maximally-entangled states, so that when the actual joint state
is of the form ρAB above, it sees a depolarization rate of 1 −
p− q. Therefore, the region of positive rate for the five MUBs
protocol is symmetric under interchange of p and q. Using
the rate expression derived in [62], we find the threshold for
p = 0 to be q ≈ 0.309. This is also the threshold of the Sifting
B protocol.
Conclusions.— We have introduced SIC-compounds as an
elegant and sophisticated discrete structure in Hilbert space.
Against initial intuition, we found that SIC-compounds can
exist beyond qubit systems and explicitly constructed a four-
dimensional SIC-compound. We found that it upholds many
unexpected symmetries as well as an operational connection
to mutually unbiased bases. Then, through our example of
SIC-compounds, we illustrated that foundational understand-
ing of discrete structures of quantum systems not only are
interesting in themselves but that they also serve as new,
powerful, tools for quantum information processing. We ap-
plied SIC-compounds towards quantum key distribution and
showed that they can produce secure key in relevant situations
in which the generalisation of the six-state protocol no longer
is useful.
Lastly, we ask whether four-dimensional SIC-compounds
can be used to construct interesting entangled measurements
of two (or more) four-dimensional systems; generalising the
measurements of [65, 66] .
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Appendix A: No SIC-compound for d = 3
We fix the representation of the WH group to X =∑d−1
k=0 |k+1〉〈k| and Z =
∑d−1
k=0 ω
k|k〉〈k|. For this fixed rep-
resentation, we prove that no SIC-compound exists for d = 3.
It is known that there are infinitely many fiducial states in
d = 3 [4, 5]. They can be parameterised using a complete
set of mutually unibased bases, which can be written (without
normalisation) as follows:
1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1

 ,

1 1 11 ω ω2
1 ω2 ω

 ,

1 ω ωω 1 ω
ω ω 1

 ,

 1 ω2 ω2ω2 1 ω2
ω2 ω2 1

 .
(A1)
All [41, 42] fiducial states can be obtained via the follow-
ing [1] procedure. Choose any one of the four bases. Then,
choose any pair of elements within the basis. Denote the first
element by |e1〉 and the second element by |e2〉. The vector
|φ〉 = (|e1〉 − eiθ|e2〉) /√2, for any θ ∈ [0, 2pi], is a valid
fiducial state. Repeating this procedure for all twelve relevant
pairs appearing in Eq. (A1), one obtains the complete set of
fiducial states.
The task of showing that no three fiducial states can form
an ON-basis is significantly simplified by the fact that the
problem is invariant in such a way that we can without loss
of generality choose the first fiducial vector correspoding to
the two first elements of the first basis in Eq. (A1), namely
|φ1〉 =
(|0〉 − eiθ1 |1〉) /√2. Moreover, since every basis in
Eq. (A1) can be transformed into every other basis in Eq. (A1),
it is sufficient to search for an ON-basis with respect to all
fiducial states associated to, for instance, the second basis.
We name the three elements of the second basis (represented
in Eq. (A1) by the Fourier matrix) {|f1〉, |f2〉, |f3〉}. Writing
|φ2〉 =
(|f1〉 − eiθ2 |f2〉) /√2, we straightforwardly obtain
that
0
!
= 〈φ1|φ2〉 ⇔
{
cos θ1 − cos(θ1 + θ2)− cos(θ2 + pi3 ) = 1
sin θ1 − sin(θ1 + θ2)− sin(θ2 + pi3 ) = 0.
(A2)
The solutions are found at (θ1, θ2) = (2pi/3, pi/3) and
(θ1, θ2) = (5pi/3, 4pi/3). To show that no third orthogonal
fiducial state exists, we also consider the cases of |φ′2〉 =(|f1〉 − eiθ3 |f3〉) /√2 and |φ2′′〉 = (|f2〉 − eiθ2 |f3〉) /√2.
These give equations analogous to Eq. (A2), each with two
solutions. Inspecting these few cases, one easily finds that no
orthogonalities exist among these solutions. Thus, we con-
clude that no qutrit SIC-compound exists. However, as is
clear from the above, it is possible to construct two orthog-
onal qutrit SICs. The perhaps easiest example corresponds to
the two orthogonal fiducial states
|φ1〉 = (1, 1, 0)
T
√
2
, |φ2〉 = (1,−1, 0)
T
√
2
. (A3)
Appendix B: Certification and falsification of SIC-compounds
We show that SIC-compounds can be certified in a semi-
device-independentmanner [53] (provided that they exist) and
that existence can be disproved using hierarchies of increas-
ingly precise necessary conditions that each can be evaluated
as a semidefinite program.
Consider a prepare-and-measure scenario in which Alice
has a random input x ∈ [d2] and Bob has an input (y, y′)
which labels all pairs of elements in [d2]. For convention, we
take y < y′. Each measurement of Bob has binary outcomes
b ∈ [2]. Alice’s states are of dimension no greater than d. In
Refs [25, 26], it was shown that the quantum maximum of the
following functional
S′ =
∑
(y,y′)
p(b = 1|y, (y, y′)) + p(b = 2|y′, (y, y′)) (B1)
is uniquely achieved in by Alice’s states forming a SIC.
Thus, it semi-device-independently certifies SIC preparations.
Moreover, one can add another (single) setting to Bob, z ∈ [1],
which has o ∈ [d2] possible outcomes, such that the modified
functional
S = S′ +
d2∑
x=1
p(o = x|x, z = 1) (B2)
7achieves its quantum maximum when both S′ and the above
sum individually are maximal. The optimal quantum value
obeys [26]
max
Q
S ≤ 1
2
√
d5(d− 1)2(d+ 1) +
(
d2
2
)
+ d, (B3)
which can be saturated if and only if Alice prepares a SIC
(provided it exists) and the setting z corresponds to the aligned
SIC-POVM (obtained from Alice’s sub-normalised prepara-
tions).
We will use this already known communication game for
SICs as a building block to construct a communication game
for SIC-compounds. Let Alice have inputs x ∈ [d2] and
i ∈ [d]. Bob takes inputs (y, y′) and j ∈ [d] and returns a
binary outcome. Moreover, Bob additionally has d settings la-
belled z ∈ [d] which have d2 possible outcomes. We are only
interested in cases in which r ≡ i = j. Let Alice and Bob play
the above game (for SICs) d times in parallel: each implemen-
tation (indexed by r) uses the preparations {(x, i = r)}x and
the measurements {(y, y′, j = r)∪ (z = r)}y,y′ . We label the
score in the r’th game by Sr. Naturally, these scores are so far
independent since they each correspond to independent sets of
preparations and measurements. If all Sr are maximal, it thus
certifies that Alice and Bob have implemented d independent
pairs of SIC preparations and SIC-POVMs. In order to certify
a SIC-compound, we need to enforce the orthogonality of the
d SICs.
To that end, we add a penalty term. If Alice’s preparation
is (x, i) and Bob implements one of his additional settings
with z 6= i, then the outcome o = x must never occur. If
this holds true for every (x, i, z 6= i), it is equivalent to a SIC-
compound given that we already know that Alice must prepare
SICs. Therefore, we choose our final correlation functional as
H =
1
d
d∑
r=1
Sr −
∑
x
i6=z
p(o = x|(x, i), z). (B4)
Using (B3) it follows that
max
Q
H ≤ max
Q
S, and that (B5)
H = max
Q
S ⇔ Alice prepares a SIC-compound. (B6)
Thus, we have constructed a quantum communication game in
which the optimal correlations are uniquely attained by SIC-
compounds.
This has two notable consequences. Firstly, we may numer-
ically search for SIC-compounds by attempting to maximise
H (which can be efficiently done through alternating convex
searches). Secondly, if one can prove thatH cannot attain the
value (B3) in a quantum model, one falsifies the existence of
any SIC-compound in the given dimension. To enable such a
proof, one can use the hierarchy of semidefinite relaxations of
the set of dimensionally restricted quantum correlations [67].
However, the computational requirements are significant due
to the large number of preparations andmeasurements. Never-
theless, semidefinite relaxations can be evaluated by employ-
ing the symmetrisation techniques of Ref [26]. For instance,
we consider the (trivial) case of deciding the existence of three
orthogonal SICs for d = 2. The existence of a SIC-compound
would enable H ≈ 12.899 while our semidefinite relaxation
proves that no larger value is possible in quantum theory than
H ≈ 12.728. We could also evaluate the case of three or-
thogonal SICs in dimension three, but were unable to obtain
a bound onH smaller than that achieved by a SIC-compound
(our SDP matrix is of size 3915). The falsification (which we
have already shown analytically) could require a higher-level
relaxation.
Appendix C: SIC-compounds and MUBs in dimension four
Standard lore has it that SICs and MUBs are unrelated
in four dimensions. SICs appear as orbits of the Weyl–
Heisenberg group, and the SIC-compound is an orbit un-
der a subgroup of the normalizer of the Weyl–Heisenberg
group. MUBs on the other hand are obtained from the bi-
partite Heisenberg group. Since the two groups are different,
one does not expect a connection between SICs and MUBs.
Nevertheless we found a connection, and it is interesting to
see how this arises.
To see this we first recapitulate the analysis by Zhu et al.
[47, 63], which shows that in this dimension the Clifford
group contains two normal copies of the Weyl–Heisenberg
group. The Clifford group contains the symplectic group
SL(2) with matrix elements chosen to be integers modulo 8.
Its representation is fixed once the representation of theWeyl–
Heisenberg group is fixed [45]. The subgroup of SL(2) that
transforms a given compound to itself is generated by the or-
der 4 symplectic matrices
G1 =
(
3 0
6 3
)
, G2 =
(
5 2
2 1
)
, (C1)
together with an order 3 Zauner matrix [45] which plays
no role in this Appendix. The corresponding unitaries are
denoted UG1 and UG2 . The generators of the twin Weyl–
Heisenberg group are then represented by [47, 63].
X˜ = e
ipi
4 UG2XZ = e
ipi
4


0 0 0 −1
0 0 −1 0
0 i 0 0
−i 0 0 0

 , (C2)
Z˜ = UG1Z = e
ipi
4


0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 i
i 0 0 0
0 1 0 0

 . (C3)
The presence of this ‘extra’ Weyl–Heisenberg group explains
why the 4 · 16 vectors in the compound can be regrouped in
such a way that 4 + 4 SICs appear [63].
But the bipartite Heisenberg group is lurking here as well.
A straightforward calculation verifies that
8X2 = σz ⊗ 1 , Z2 = 1 ⊗ σz ,
(C4)
−iXZ˜ = σy ⊗ σy , ZX˜ = 1 ⊗ σx ,
where σx, σy, σz are the usual Pauli matrices. These local
operators generate the bipartite Heisenberg group, they leave a
given SIC compound invariant, and they can be used to create
the MUBs mentioned in the main text.
The usual construction of five MUBs proceeds by divid-
ing the bipartite Heisenberg group into maximal abelian sub-
groups. In the main text we obtained 4 MUBs, all of them
unbiased relative to the computational basis, as an orbit under
the bipartite Heisenberg group. This is the Alltop construction
ofMUBs. The fact that this constructionworks in dimension 4
is already known [64], but the relation to theWeyl-Heisenberg
Clifford group is new.
Appendix D: QKD security proof details
Following [56–58], we can treat the sifting operation as
a quantum operation as follows. Since the SIC-compound
forms a single POVM, measurement can be described by the
isometry |φ〉 7→ 14
∑
jk |j〉|k〉〈ψjk |φ〉, followed by usual pro-
jective meaurement of the |j〉 and |k〉 registers. Sifting can
then be regarded as projective measurement of the appropri-
ate registers, either (j2, k) or (j1, j2), followed by postselec-
tion based on comparing the results using public communi-
cation. Thus, each (j2, k) combination in Sifting A, for in-
stance, gives rise to a Kraus operator Sj2,k which maps the
AB system to the raw keys KAKB according to Sj2,k :
|φ〉A ⊗ |ψ〉B 7→ N
∑
i,i′ |i〉KA |i′〉KB 〈ψi,j2,k|A〈ψ∗i′,j2,k|B ,
where N is a normalization factor. (Recall that the conver-
sion requires Bob to use the complex conjugate states |ψ∗jk〉.)
The case of Sifting B is entirely similar.
In this formalism it is now easy to confirm that the sifting
procedure is covariant under the automorphismG of the SIC-
compound, which is generated byX , Z , U , V , and one further
unitary operator,W , which cyclically permutes the last three
vector components and leaves the first fixed. Then, in the case
of Sifting A, for any element Y ∈ G and combination (j2, k),
the operator Sj2,kY ⊗ Y ∗ = Sj′2,k′ for some j′2 and k′ (up
to a phase), because the automorphism generators each pre-
serve the individual rows and columns of the Latin square.
Importantly, in both sifting procedures under consideration,
the protocol discards the information besides the sifted key,
e.g. the (j2, k) values in Sifting A and the (j1, j2) values
in Sifting B. Therefore we may average the input state ρAB
over G, since the protocol will effectively only see the state
ρ¯AB =
∑
Y ∈G Y ⊗ Y ∗ρABY † ⊗ Y T . Straightforward calcu-
lation shows that ρ¯AB = (1−p−q)ΦAB + qpiAB + pκAB for
some positive parameters q, p with q + p ≤ 1, where ΦAB is
the maximally-entangled state, piAB is the maximally-mixed
state, and κAB is the diagonal state of perfect uniform corre-
lation.
The protocol proceeds to distill secret key from the raw
key using information reconciliation and privacy amplifica-
tion. Given a post-sifted state σKAKBE , we can appeal to the
rate formula of [60], r ≥ H(KA|E)σ −H(KA|KB)σ , where
H(KA|E)σ is the conditional entropy. The post-sifted state
will be of the form σKAKBE = M(S1,1ρ¯ABES†1,1), where
M denotes the measurement of the KA and KB systems,
each in the standard basis. This is a slight departure from and
improvement on [56–58], which for simplicity uses only the
Bell-diagonal part of S1,1ρ¯ABES
†
1,1. This lowers the key rate
and is unnecessary here as the state ρ¯ABE itself is of a very
simple form.
